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Prayer for Relief:  Considering the 
Limits of Religious Practices in the 
Military 
Jonathan S. Sussman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”  
U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
 
The United States military is a unique institution in that our 
Supreme Court permits the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to 
employ clergy, called Chaplains, as full time members of the force.  
However, a non-Christian or atheist in the military might consider 
whether they were cut from the wrong cloth—with frequent 
prayers at public events, reverberating with the inspiration of 
Christian invocations, substituting “in His name” for “in Jesus’ 
name,” or other such litany.  The crusade mounted herein 
concerns the DoD and constitutional limitations applicable to 
 
* M.P.A, University of Arizona, 2012; J.D., Roger Williams University School 
of Law, 2009; B.A., Rutgers University, 2006.  Jonathan S. Sussman served as 
an active duty Captain and military attorney in the United States Air Force JAG 
Corps for over four years.  He also formerly served on the adjunct faculty of the 
University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy.  The views 
presented in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Department of Defense or its Components.  I would like to 
dedicate this Article to Captain Douglas Newborn, USAF.  While he was one of 
my staunchest critics, he did so as one of my greatest supporters.  If he and I can 
balance each other out, the military can balance the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.  Direct questions and comments to jsussman18@gmail.com. 
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religious practices in the military, with an emphasis on the 
Chaplaincy and public prayer.  Even with consideration of the 
constitutionality of the Chaplaincy, common religious practices in 
the military appear to run afoul of both DoD regulations and 
constitutional case law.  These include prayers at nonreligious, 
mandatory events, particularly when they are recurring, as well 
as unit pressure, particularly from leadership, to adopt religion or 
religious activities. 
The First Amendment is the primary guidance for 
determining a formative stance on the appropriate separation of 
church and state.1  There are two clauses in the First Amendment 
that provide the legal analysis for determining the 
constitutionality of religious activities in the public sector, the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.2  The former 
forbids government endorsement of religion, and the latter forbids 
the government from infringing on an individual’s personal 
practice of his or her religion.3  While there is much debate over 
the founders’ intentions for the balance between the religion 
clauses in the Constitution4—if a singular objective can even be 
gleaned—the Supreme Court has developed significant 
jurisprudence on the matter.5  Though waxing and waning, these 
cases ultimately set the outermost boundaries for what role 
religion can play in the federal government. 
One thing is for certain, the greatest threat to a realistic 
discussion of this issue is the continued misbranding of the 
debate.  It is not about freedom of religion in the military.  
Consider the following quote to illustrate this common failure to 
properly frame the question.  In response to the DoD’s meeting 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and 
the Demise of the Free Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 
73, 79–84  (1997); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of Establishment Clause of First Amendment—U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases, 15 A.L.R. FED. 2d 573, 585 (2007). 
 5.  See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. 
Ct. 1811 (2014); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 
370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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with Michael Weinstein, an admittedly provocative critic of 
religious practices in the military, Tom Perkins of the Family 
Research Council stated, “[w]hy would military leadership be 
meeting with one of the most rabid atheists in America to discuss 
religious freedom in the military[?]”6  Mr. Weinstein’s positions 
aside, the answer to Mr. Perkins question is, of course, atheists, 
rabid, or otherwise, have the exact same protections afforded under 
the First Amendment as do religious people.  The issue is not 
religious freedom, but of determining the appropriate 
constitutional balance between the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses.  The analysis of this Article looks to determine 
the parameters of this balance as follows. 
Section Two begins with a review of military regulations 
addressing religious practices among service members.  In 
addition to DoD regulations, Air Force Instruction 1-1 (“AF 1-1”) is 
used as a branch-specific example.7  While it is the clearest 
direction the Air Force provides, it nevertheless falls short of an 
applicable guide.  While AF 1-1 was intended to mitigate 
questionable religious practices, even read in a light most 
constitutionally favorable, this document may well fail the 
requirements of the First Amendment. 
Section Three reviews applicable case law.  The review begins 
with the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman—the leading case on the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment—where the Supreme 
Court established the Lemon test.8  While Establishment Clause 
cases have inspired some legal scholars to believe that the Lemon 
test has been replaced,9 a deeper reading demonstrates that 
Lemon remains applicable and useful.10  The following Section 
 
 6.  Todd Starnes, Pentagon: Religious Proselytizing is Not Permitted, 
FOX NEWS, http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/pentagon-
religious-proselytizing-is-not-permitted.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2014) 
(quoting Tony Perkins, President, Family Research Council) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 7.  U.S Air Force Instruction No. 1-1, ¶ 2.11 (2012) [hereinafter AFI 1-1], 
available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af/publication/afi1-
1/afi1-1.pdf. 
 8.  403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 9.  See, e.g., Major (ret.) David E. Fitzkee & Captain Linell A. Letendre, 
Religion in the Military: Navigating the Channel Between the Religion 
Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (2007). 
 10.  See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 587; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620–21; see also 
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying the Lemon 
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outlines the strict scrutiny standard of review applied in free 
exercise cases, focusing on Sherbert v. Verner.11  Next the Article 
reviews Katcoff v. Marsh, the preeminent case on the 
constitutionality of the military Chaplaincy.12  There, the Second 
Circuit found that the Chaplaincy was constitutional insofar as its 
activities served the compelling interest of religious 
accommodation only where no alternative method of 
accommodation was available.13  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case to determine whether certain military 
installations actually required religious accommodation funded by 
the government in areas where civilian religious establishments 
were available.14 
Next, the Article progresses into a judicial review of public 
prayer in the forum from which most of the relevant case law has 
developed, schools.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
prayer in primary and secondary education institutions poses a 
potentially high risk of coercion,15 and the nondenominational 
nature of prayer is irrelevant in this determination as such 
activity is inherently unconstitutional.16  Further, at least by the 
language of the courts, the prohibitions utilized in primary and 
secondary education institutions are not limited to these forums.17  
In the post-secondary educational forum, the Fourth Circuit, in 
Mellen v. Bunting, determined that military colleges suffer similar 
coercive issues with school-sponsored prayer as did the 
aforementioned schools.18  The one limited exception to the 
prohibition on government sponsored religious activity is found in 
legislative prayer.19 
Section Four reviews religious activity using free speech 
 
criteria and “treating the endorsement test as a refinement of Lemon’s second 
prong” (emphasis added)). 
 11.  374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 12.  755 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 13.  Id. at 237. 
 14.  Id. at 238. 
 15.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 586–87. 
 16.  Id. at 610; see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 224–25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). 
 17.  See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 368 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 18.  Id. at 371; accord Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295–96 (D.C. Cir. 
1972).  
 19.  See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014); Marsh 
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). 
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analysis, focusing on Widmar v. Vincent, the major case on the 
topic.20  This case clarified that by permitting general access to a 
facility, a school creates an open forum that cannot be limited as 
to content without a compelling government interest.21  This 
Section also addresses Greer v. Spock, the case which clarified 
that a military base is not a public forum.22  By analogy, Section 
Three addresses another area where speech has seen major 
restriction by the military and federal government, political 
speech.23 
Section Five reviews why coercion is an inherent part of the 
military, which magnifies the need for special care in determining 
appropriate religious activity.  This analysis considers the purpose 
underlying Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(“UCMJ”)24 and revisits the reasoning of Mellen.25 
Section Six applies the case law to military prayer.  The 
analysis then extends into more opaque hypothetical situations, 
many based upon current military activities.  These activities 
include proselytizing at work and military media outlets 
encouraging spiritual activity. 
This Article poses a large number of questions, some 
rhetorical, some actual.  While this Article’s thesis is that the 
military is vulnerable to successful legal action in the future, the 
constitutionally permissible religious activities of the military 
 
 20.  454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 21.  Id. at 269–70. 
 22.  424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
 23.  See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“When 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials 
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”); Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to 
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his 
dismissal from public employment.”); see also  The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 7321–7326 (2012) (regulating the political activities of government 
employees);U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1344.10 (2008) 
[hereinafter DoD Dir. 1344.10], available at http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/ 
defense_ethics/ethics_regulation/1344-10.html (providing DoD “policies on 
political activities of members of the Armed Forces”). 
 24.  Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012) (prohibiting 
compulsory self-incrimination in the military). 
 25.  327 F.3d 355, 371–72 (4th Cir. 2003).   
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have not yet been squarely addressed.26  Therefore, these 
questions serve to highlight the complexity and, in some cases, the 
severity of the issue of religious practices in the military. 
II. CURRENT STATUS OF THE DOD ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICES 
Before addressing the constitutional questions, this Section 
addresses the current military regulations on both the Chaplaincy 
and military prayer.  The takeaway, in most cases, is that the 
regulations are vague at best.  Further, many of these regulations, 
at the least, skirt the constitutional line and may cross it. 
Department of Defense Directive 1304.19 lists the purposes of 
the Chaplaincy.27  The regulation explains that the function of the 
Chaplaincy is to: (1) “advise and assist commanders in the 
discharge of their responsibilities”; (2) “provide for the free 
exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed 
by the Constitution”; (3) “assist commanders in managing 
Religious Affairs”; and (4) “serve as the principal advisors to 
commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on 
military operations.”28  While it is unclear from the regulation 
whether the list is exhaustive, in actuality some practices of the 
military Chaplaincy extend past these primary duties. 
To use the Air Force as an example, AF 1-1 gives some advice 
on the general application of religious practices in the military.29  
Paragraph 2.11 explains: 
Leaders at all levels must balance constitutional 
protections for an individual’s free exercise of religion or 
other personal beliefs and the constitutional prohibition 
against governmental establishment of religion.  For 
example, they must avoid the actual or apparent use of 
 
 26.  For an excellent review of grievances filed against the military thus 
far, as well as a platform for a successful suit against the military, see Jeffrey 
Lakin, Note, Atheists in Foxholes: Examining the Current State of Religious 
Freedom in the United States Military, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 713, 735–36 
(2011). 
 27.  See U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1304.19, ¶ 4.1 (2004) 
[hereinafter DoD Dir. 1304.19], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/ 
directives/corres/pdf/130419p.pdf; accord U.S Air Force Instruction No. 52-
101 (2013), available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_hc/ 
publication/afi52-101/afi52-101.pdf. 
 28.  See DoD Dir. 1304.19, supra note 27, ¶ 4.1. 
 29.  AFI 1-1, supra note 7, ¶ 2.11. 
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their position to promote their personal religious beliefs 
to their subordinates or to extend preferential treatment 
for any religion.30 
Note, the first line of the paragraph identifies two protections: 
(1) “an individual’s free exercise of religion” and (2) “other 
personal beliefs.”31  What are these “other personal beliefs”?  The 
next sentence does not clarify, but provides, what appears to be, 
nonexclusive examples of what leaders are prohibited from 
doing.32  Leaders are prohibited from: (1) promoting “their 
personal religious beliefs” or (2) giving “preferential treatment for 
any religion.”33  To determine what is meant by “other personal 
beliefs,” a starting point might be to ask the following questions: 
to an atheist, wouldn’t even a nondenominational prayer promote 
a leader’s personal religious beliefs?  Indeed, would it not show 
favoritism to the faithful over nonreligious?  Isn’t it possible that 
“other personal beliefs,” includes—and perhaps refers directly to—
a lack of religious belief, particularly as juxtaposed with the prior 
language which accounts for religious personnels’ “free exercise of 
religion?”  Taking the analysis one step further, doesn’t a 
nondenominational prayer appear to show military preference for 
Christianity when conducted at a public military event by a 
Christian Chaplain, in a fashion typically affiliated with Christian 
invocations, at the behest of the base commander or other high 
ranking official? 
Consider the language of the Air Force’s 2006 Revised Interim 
Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force: 
Voluntary participation in worship, prayer, study, and 
discussion is integral to the free exercise of religion.  
Nothing in this guidance should be understood to limit 
the substance of voluntary discussions of religion, or the 
exercise of free speech, where it is reasonably clear that 
the discussions are personal, not official, and they can be 
reasonably free of the potential for, or appearance of, 
coercion. 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
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Public prayer should not imply Government endorsement 
of religion and should not usually be part of routine 
official business.  Mutual respect and common sense 
should always be applied, including consideration of 
unusual circumstances and the needs of the command.  
Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a 
moment of silence may be appropriate for military 
ceremonies of special importance when its primary 
purpose is not the advancement of religious beliefs.  
Military chaplains are trained in these matters.34 
An inartful drafting begs the question, is it the ceremony that 
cannot have the primary purpose of advancing religion or the 
prayer that cannot have the primary purpose of advancing 
religion?  With regard to the former reading of the regulation, the 
sheer presence of the Chaplain during such an event demonstrates 
its religious nature.  If the prayer itself does not make the event 
primarily religious, at what point is that threshold met?  The next 
question is, what are “military ceremonies of special 
importance”?35  Are they Military Developmental Education 
graduations, base-sponsored remembrances, or monthly base 
readiness runs?  Regarding the latter reading of the regulation, 
when would even a nondenominational prayer ever have a 
primary purpose that was not to advance religious beliefs, 
particularly if conducted by a Chaplain?  Perhaps a secular appeal 
for good tidings might have that purpose, but then why use 
federal funds to pay a Chaplain for that purpose?  Realistically, no 
“prayers” are secularized, frequently concluding with “in His 
name” or other directly religious references.  Even if the 
regulation is deemed to permit prayers at most Air Force events, 
this does not guarantee its constitutionality.  Indeed, it is likely 
the Supreme Court would take issue with some of these practices.  
To expound, this analysis continues with the case law on the 
religion clauses. 
 
 34.  Memorandum from the Sec’y, Air Force & the Chief-of-Staff, Air 
Force to All Major Commands on Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning 
Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force (Feb. 9, 2006). 
 35.  Id. 
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III. THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
The Establishment Clause, as previously addressed, has been 
interpreted to prohibit a certain intermingling of government and 
religion, whereas the Free Exercise Clause guarantees the ability 
of the populace to engage in religious practices free of government 
intervention.36  Determining which clause forms the basis of a 
court’s analysis depends on whether religious activity is 
undertaken by a government actor (Establishment) or prohibited 
by a government actor (Free Exercise).37  The former requires 
application of what the Supreme Court has entitled the Lemon 
test.38  The latter requires the application of the strict scrutiny 
test where a government action is not religiously neutral.39 
A. The Establishment Clause: The Lemon Test 
The Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman stemmed from 
constitutional challenges to state government aid that was being 
given to Rhode Island and Pennsylvania private, religious schools 
to be used for secular subjects.40  In a stunning example of what 
must be termed puritan modesty, the Court explained the 
ambiguous line between the religion clauses, stating, “we can only 
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily 
sensitive area of constitutional law.”41  The Court further stated, 
“[t]he language of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is 
 
 36.  U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–77 (1990) (“The free exercise of religion 
means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious 
doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all 
‘governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.’” (quoting Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963))), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), as recognized in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 37.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 
1410 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 38.  See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
 39.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–82; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03. 
 40.  403 U.S. at 606–07.  In particular, Pennsylvania reimbursed the 
schools for the cost of salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for 
teachers that taught secular subjects.  Id.  Rhode Island paid a fifteen 
percent salary increase directly to secular teachers, bypassing the schools 
completely.  Id. at 607. 
 41.  Id. at 612. 
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at best opaque.”42  However, the Court elaborated, “[i]ts authors 
did not simply prohibit the establishment of a state church or a 
state religion . . . Instead they commanded that there should be no 
law respecting an establishment of religion.”43  The Court noted: 
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous 
or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations 
of our democratic system of government, but political 
division along religious lines was one of the principal 
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to 
protect.44 
Based upon this analysis, the Court held that three particular 
government actions were prohibited, “sponsorship, financial 
support and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activity.”45  In deeming the two state statutes unconstitutional, 
the Court explained that the appropriate test for determining a 
permissible law challenged under the Establishment Clause is: (1) 
if the law has a secular purpose;46 (2) if its principle or primary 
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) if it does not 
foster excessive government entanglement with religion.47  
Indeed, the Court explained that the more people that are served 
by programs of this nature, the greater the offense to the 
Establishment Clause, as political division would ensue.48 
The argument has been made that there are independent 
legal tests, separate from Lemon, upon which the Supreme Court 
has relied.49  This is unsurprising as the majority in Lemon 
 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 44.  Id. at 622. 
 45.  Id. at 612 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970)). 
 46.  Later case law clarified that, in order to satisfy the “purpose” 
element, one must look at the statute through the lens of an “objective 
observer.”  See Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 9; see also Harris v. City 
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1411–14 (7th Cir. 1991).  As such, the court must be 
able to conceive a secular purpose such as education, health, or safety.  See 
id. at 1411.  If there are multiple purposes, the primary purpose must be 
secular.  See Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 9. 
 47.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13. 
 48.  Id. at 622. 
 49.  See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11; see also Mellen v. 
Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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referred to the elements of the Lemon test independently as three 
tests.50  An article offered that the Supreme Court has established 
a separate “endorsement test,” citing County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU.51  In Allegheny, the Court prohibited a crèche on public 
property, which read, “[g]lory to God for the birth of Jesus 
Christ.”52  The theory behind the two authors’ contention is that 
in order to violate the Constitution, a law must actually and 
directly endorse religion.53  However, the Court in Allegheny 
explicitly references the Lemon test, and it only indicates that 
“[i]n recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to 
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the 
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long 
had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”54  The 
Court does not discount Lemon, but clarifies that “despite 
divergence at the bottom line, . . . the government’s use of 
religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of 
endorsing religious beliefs.”55  In other words, at the least, the 
Establishment Clause is violated by government endorsement of 
religion.  An actual endorsement test is only derived from Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in Allegheny.56  Indeed later courts saw 
the endorsement test simply as a refinement of the second prong 
of the Lemon test.57 
The aforementioned article also referenced a “coercion test,” 
which it derived from Lee v. Weisman.58  Dealt with in greater 
detail below, the claimant in Lee sought to enjoin a rabbi from 
providing a nondenominational prayer at a public school 
graduation ceremony.59  The Court found the activity 
unconstitutional due to the quasi-obligatory nature of a 
 
 50.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 
 51.  Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989)). 
 52.  492 U.S. at 599–602. 
 53.  Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11–12. 
 54.  492 U.S. at 592. 
 55.  Id. at 597. 
 56.  Id. at 627 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 
 57.  See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 58.  Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11–12 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)). 
 59.  505 U.S. at 583–84.  
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graduation ceremony.60  According to proponents of the coercion 
test, “[t]he Court in Lee specifically declined to reconsider the 
Lemon test and instead used the coercion analysis to strike down 
the prayer.”61  To clarify, the Court in Lee appears to only be 
remarking that it would not reconsider the Lemon test in order to 
overrule Lemon, as requested by the petitioner in the case.62  The 
intent was not to discount the Lemon test, but to acknowledge the 
violation in Lee to be so flagrant as to fail even the limited 
requirement that, “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees 
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate 
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.’”63  The nomenclature of the coercion test, once again, appears 
to derive from Justice O’Connor’s concurrences.64 
The Supreme Court has made a firmer constitutional front 
against certain extreme instances of government religious activity, 
resulting in alternate tests being derived.  However, the Lemon 
test is still alive and well. 
B. Free Exercise 
Free exercise has also gleaned multiple tests.  In Reynolds v. 
United States, the court reviewed a conviction against a member 
of the Mormon faith who violated the anti-bigamy laws in taking a 
second wife.65  The defendant challenged the law on free exercise 
grounds.66  The Court explained that even the founding of the 
United States saw constitutional protections inapplicable in 
instances “in violation of social duties or subversive of good 
order.”67  The Court, therefore, upheld the conviction on the basis 
 
 60.  Id. at 586. 
 61.  Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 11 n.66; see also Mellen, 327 
F.3d at 370. 
 62.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 63.  Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
 64.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628–29 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), abrogated by Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).  
 65.  98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878). 
 66.  Id. at 161–62. 
 67.  Id. at 164. 
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that from its founding, polygamy was not deemed protected under 
the Free Exercise Clause.68  The Court further explained the 
ramifications of allowing practices such as polygamy.69  It 
explained that convicting citizens for polygamy who do so for 
religious purposes versus secular purposes introduced a new 
element to criminal law.70  Further, allowing polygamy for 
religious purposes promised a slippery slope of protection for 
religious practices of even greater public concern, such as human 
sacrifice.71  This case, while beginning the analysis, does not 
provide an easily applicable rule for future cases.72 
The Court in Sherbert v. Verner provided the modern 
standard for most free exercise jurisprudence.73  The case involved 
the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist 
Church member who was fired for the inability to work on 
Saturdays, which was part of her religious obligation.74  The law 
allowed employers to preclude benefits from individuals who 
refused suitable work provided by the employer, and the state 
found that failure to accept work on Saturday fell under this 
preclusion.75  The Court reversed the state’s decision explaining 
that the petitioner’s religious beliefs were not that which “posed 
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,” and the 
state provided no compelling government interest to justify the 
prohibition.76  The Court explained, “‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible 
limitation.’”77  In explaining how this burden is met by a party, 
the Court used the example of Sunday closing laws—which put 
 
 68.  Id. at 165. 
 69.  Id. at 166. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
906 (1990) (holding that Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to 
members of the Native American church who ingested peyote in violation of a 
generally applicable law against peyote, even without a compelling 
government interest), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, as recognized in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 73.  374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963); cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–82. 
 74.  Id. at 399–400. 
 75.  Id. at 401. 
 76.  Id. at 402–03. 
 77.  Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
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Jewish merchants who could not work on Saturday at a 
disadvantage—as satisfying a strong state interest in a rest day 
for all workers.78 
C. The Religion Clauses and the Military Chaplaincy 
The Chaplaincy is a regular installment at many military 
events, frequently beginning events with a nondenominational 
invocation.  Courts have found the Chaplaincy to be 
constitutional, but only for specific purposes.79  In Katcoff v. 
Marsh, the Second Circuit reviewed a case that involved a 
constitutional challenge brought by two law students, claiming 
that the Army Chaplaincy was an unconstitutional violation of the 
Establishment Clause.80  The Second Circuit explained that there 
is a long history of the Chaplaincy in the military.81  Further, the 
fact that the military sends troops outside of their home 
environments, subject to deadly circumstances, necessitates 
Chaplains that can move with the military in order to satisfy their 
rights under the Free Exercise Clause.82  The court noted, “[t]he 
chaplain’s principal duties are to conduct religious services 
(including periodic worship, baptisms, marriages, funerals and the 
like), to furnish religious education to soldiers and their families, 
and to counsel soldiers with respect to a wide variety of personal 
problems.”83  The court reiterated its formula, explaining: 
The government must be neutral when it comes to 
competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on 
any person.  It may not make a religious observance 
compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to 
observe a religious holiday, or to take religious 
 
 78.  Id. at 408 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)).  It is 
interesting that the Court uses “Blue Laws” as an example of a sufficient, 
compelling government interest. The preceding paragraph described the 
requirement that a limitation on free speech must be narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling governmental interest; yet, a law requiring employees 
receive any one day a week off could accomplish the same goal without 
unduly impacting individuals unable to work on Saturday.  
 79.  See, e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 80.  Id. at 224–25. 
 81.  Id. at 225. 
 82.  Id. at 228, 232. 
 83.  Id. at 228. 
SUSSMANFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2015  3:25 PM 
2015] PRAYER FOR RELIEF 89 
instruction.84 
The court continued: 
Since the program meets the requirement of 
voluntariness by leaving the practice of religion solely to 
the individual soldier, who is free to worship or not as he 
chooses without fear of any discipline or stigma, it might 
be viewed as not proscribed by the Establishment 
Clause.85 
The court elaborated that, looking at the Chaplaincy 
according to the Lemon test, on its face it appeared 
unconstitutional.86  However, looked at in light of the War Powers 
and Free Exercise Clauses, the opposite conclusion was reached.87  
Further: 
The purpose and effect of the program is to make religion, 
religious education, counseling and religious facilities 
available to military personnel and their families under 
circumstances where the practice of religion would 
otherwise be denied as a practical matter to all or a 
substantial number.88 
Note however, that the court did not contend that the ability of 
the clergy to engage in religious activity under the Free Exercise 
Clause was absolute: 
If the ability of such personnel to worship in their own 
communities is not inhibited by their military service and 
funds for these chaplains and facilities would not 
otherwise be expended, the justification for a 
governmental program of religious support for them is 
questionable and, notwithstanding our deference to 
Congress in military matters, requires a showing that 
they are relevant to and reasonably necessary for the 
conduct of our national defense by the Army.89 
 
 84.  Id. at 231 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85.  Id. at 231–32. 
 86.  Id. at 232. 
 87.  Id. at 234–35. 
 88.  Id. at 237. 
 89.  Id. at 238. 
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The court ultimately determined that the Chaplaincy is 
constitutional in certain circumstances, limited to what is 
necessary to provide for the accommodation of military members’ 
free exercise when those members are deprived of access to clergy 
due to military service.90  Indeed, based upon the court’s limited 
holding, the case was remanded to determine whether Chaplaincy 
programs were required in busy, urban areas where civilian 
religious establishments are available.91 
D. Engel v. Vitale and Progeny: Public Prayer 
In Katcoff, the Second Circuit held that the use of the 
Chaplaincy for limited purposes is constitutional.92  While this 
could easily serve to satisfy the issue, it fails to address public 
prayers at military events.  Without dispositive rulings, analysis 
of this issue must be derived from persuasive case law.  While not 
in the active duty military context, the issue has been addressed 
with regard to public schools. 
Engel v. Vitale, involved a New York public school system that 
directed each class to recite the prayer on a daily basis, 
“[a]lmighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and 
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country.”93  The policy permitted those who were not interested to 
refrain or leave the room.94  The Supreme Court held, “[t]here can, 
of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of daily classroom 
invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer 
is a religious activity.  It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and 
supplication for the blessings of the Almighty.”95  In finding this 
prayer unconstitutional, the Court explained: 
[T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting 
an establishment of religion must at least mean that in 
this country it is no part of the business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American 
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on 
by government.  It is a matter of history that this very 
 
 90.  Id. at 237–38. 
 91.  Id. at 238. 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
 94.  Id. at 430. 
 95.  Id. at 424. 
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practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers 
for religious services was one of the reasons which caused 
many of our early colonists to leave England and seek 
religious freedom in America.96 
In response to the argument that the prayer’s nondenominational 
nature rendered it harmless to the Establishment Clause, the 
Court wrote: 
The respondents’ argument to the contrary, which is 
largely based upon the contention that the Regents’ 
prayer is ‘nondenominational’ and the fact that the 
program, as modified and approved by state courts, does 
not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits 
those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused 
from the room, ignores the essential nature of the 
program’s constitutional defects.  Neither the fact that the 
prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact that 
its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can 
serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment 
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause.97 
In other words, neither the nondenominational nature of a 
prayer, nor the voluntariness of the prayer may be considered in 
determining the constitutionality of government sponsored prayer.  
Justice Douglas adds another layer of analysis in his concurring 
opinion.98  Of interest however, Justice Douglas frames the issue 
in terms of the finance of religious exercise.99  According to Justice 
Douglas, the issue would be uncomplicated following the 
longstanding view of the Supreme Court that the government 
remain neutral to religion100—but for Everson v. Board of 
Education, which permits funding for bus transportation to 
students attending parochial schools.101  Both concurring with the 
majority in Engel and disagreeing in dicta with the Everson 
decision, he explains that practices like those in the current case 
 
 96.  Id. at 425 (emphasis added). 
 97.  Id. at 430 (emphasis added); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). 
 98.  See Engel, 370 U.S. at 437–44 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 443–44.  
 101.  330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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are impermissible in any publicly funded forum.102 
So as to ensure there is no confusion, the ruling in Engel has 
not been limited to daily prayers.103  Courts have applied the 
same standard to nonsectarian prayers conducted annually at 
graduations.104  In Lee, briefly discussed above, a student and 
parent filed for injunctive relief following a failed attempt to 
prohibit a rabbi from providing a nondenominational prayer at the 
student’s graduation ceremony.105  The Court noted the quasi-
 
 102.  Engel, 370 U.S. at 437–44 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 103.  See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000); 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992). 
 104.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. 
 105.  Id. at 580–81.  Note the sectarian language of the prayers in this 
case:  
INVOCATION 
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:  
For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the 
rights of minorities are protected, we thank You.  May these 
young men and women grow up to enrich it.  
 
For the liberty of America, we thank You.  May these new 
graduates grow up to guard it.  
 
For the political process of America in which all its citizens may 
participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we 
thank You.  May those we honor this morning always turn to it 
in trust.  
 
For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of 
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to 
share it.  
 
May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, 





O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the 
capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous 
commencement.  
Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an 
important milestone.  Send Your blessings upon the teachers 
and administrators who helped prepare them.  
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obligatory nature of graduation ceremonies, despite attendance 
not being required to receive a diploma.106  It explained: 
The government involvement with religious activity in 
this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-
sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public 
school.  Conducting this formal religious observance 
conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises 
for students, and that suffices to determine the question 
before us.  The principle that government may 
accommodate the free exercise of religion does not 
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.107 
The Supreme Court has made clear that accommodation under the 
Free Exercise Clause is not a proper basis for such a program in 
the face of the Establishment Clause’s limitations.108  In an 
explanation rivaled only by the poetry of the Psalms, Justice 
Kennedy wrote: 
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of 
nonsectarian prayer, prayer within the embrace of what 
is known as the Judeo–Christian tradition, prayer which 
is more acceptable than one which, for example, makes 
explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ, 
or to a patron saint.  There may be some support, as an 
empirical observation, to the statement of the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, picked up by Judge 
Campbell’s dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case, 
 
The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, 
help them to understand that we are not complete with 
academic knowledge alone.  We must each strive to fulfill what 
You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk 
humbly.  
 
We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us 
and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.  
 
AMEN 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106.  Id. at 586. 
 107.  Id. at 587. 
 108.  See id. 
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that there has emerged in this country a civic religion, 
one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are 
not.  . . .  If common ground can be defined which permits 
once conflicting faiths to express the shared conviction 
that there is an ethic and a morality which transcend 
human invention, the sense of community and purpose 
sought by all decent societies might be advanced.  But 
though the First Amendment does not allow the 
government to stifle prayers which aspire to these ends, 
neither does it permit the government to undertake that 
task for itself.109 
Once again, the sectarian nature of the prayer was irrelevant 
to the Court’s calculus.110  In a similar vein, Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion explained that the Establishment Clause is 
equally applicable to acts favoring religion generally as it is to acts 
favoring one religion over another.111 
Thus, constitutionality is not contingent on the frequency of 
the prayer at issue.  Further, even entirely voluntary graduation 
ceremonies remain impermissible forums for school prayer.  
Finally, according to Justice Souter, the Establishment Clause, 
more than even requiring diversity of religious views, requires 
neutrality of religious views.112 
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court 
extended the prohibition even further—to entirely non-mandatory, 
after-school events.113  In Santa Fe, the Court prohibited student-
initiated and led prayer at football games.114  While the Court 
accepts the notion that there is a distinction between public and 
private speech, they nevertheless find that the invocations at 
issue were “authorized by a government policy and take place on 
government property at government-sponsored school-related 
events,” such that no defense of private speech existed.115  
 
 109.  Id. at 589. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 609–10 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 112.  Id. at 610, 617–18; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“The First Amendment teaches that a government 
neutral in the field of religion better serves all religious interests.”).  
 113.  530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000). 
 114.  Id. at 301. 
 115.  Id. at 302–03. 
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Therefore, at least in the school context, though the language is 
not nearly so narrow, religious activity sponsored by a government 
entity, even at entirely extracurricular events and requested by 
the students themselves, is unconstitutional. 
The preceding two decisions serve predominantly to re-
adjudicate conclusions already reached in Engel.  Nevertheless, to 
acknowledge the opposing position, consider the following.  
Although the Court extended the Establishment Clause 
prohibition to include less regular recitation of prayers, yearly 
graduations, and football games vice daily prayer, the cases 
operated under a position more narrow than Engel, that 
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”116  All of these cases, including Engel, 
could further be read as relating to school children.117  As the 
Court noted, “there are heightened concerns with protecting 
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the 
elementary and secondary public schools.”118  However, the Court 
never withdrew from Engel’s broader holding that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits official prayers “for any group of 
the American people” by an instrumentality of the government, 
whether coercive or not.119  The Court in Lee later noted that, 
while the concern for coercion is most pronounced in the school 
context, the concern is not necessarily limited to that forum.120  
Further, “[t]he First Amendment’s Religion Clauses mean that 
religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to be 
either proscribed or prescribed by the State.”121  However broadly 
or narrowly these cases are read, there is also case law, at the 
post-secondary level, which discusses the coercive nature of 
military institutions. 
Mellen v. Bunting, a Fourth Circuit case, dealt with the 
practice of prayer in a military-style institution.122  Mellen 
involved a suit against the Virginia Military Institute (“VMI”) by a 
 
 116.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). 
 117.  See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301; Lee, 505 U.S. at 581; Engel, 370 U.S. 
at 422. 
 118.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
 119.  Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. 
 120.  505 U.S. at 592. 
 121.  Id. at 589.  
 122.  327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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former cadet requesting an injunction and damages due to the 
superintendent’s practice of supper prayer.123  Analyzing the case 
under both the coercion analysis and Lemon test, the court issued 
an injunction explaining that, “[a]lthough VMI’s cadets are not 
children, in VMI’s educational system they are uniquely 
susceptible to coercion.  VMI’s adversative method of education 
emphasizes the detailed regulation of conduct and the 
indoctrination of a strict moral code.”124  The court explained that 
it is joined in its contention by a case decided by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Anderson v. Laird, which 
dealt with a federal requirement for military academy students to 
attend religious services on Sundays.125  Without agreeing, the 
court noted that its sister circuits have held that traditional 
college students suffer less coercion than grade school children, in 
terms of graduation ceremonies.126  Although the court confirmed 
that other circuits dealing with prayers at civilian higher 
education institutions have held differently,127 there appeared to 
be no cases involving military institutions that held to the 
contrary.  The Anderson case recognized by the court in Mellen 
had similar results and, perhaps, some broader implications.128  
This case involved a suit by cadets and midshipmen from West 
Point, the Naval Academy, and the Air Force Academy, who 
challenged rules requiring attendance at Protestant, Catholic, or 
Jewish religious services on Sundays.129  Failure to attend had 
punitive repercussions, including possible expulsion.130  The 
schools had an exemption for conscientious objection to attendance 
at services, but the court was not persuaded that this healed the 
constitutional violation.131  The court noted that, insofar as a 
cadet may want occasionally to pray alone, they are coerced into 
 
 123.  Id. at 362–63.  
 124.  Id. at 371. 
 125.  Id. at 368 (citing Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 
1972)).   
 126.  Id. (citing Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985–86 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237–38 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 127.  Id. (citing Tanford, 104 F.3d 982; Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d 232).   
 128.  466 F.2d at 283–84. 
 129.  Id. at 284. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 293. 
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attendance, and therefore, the action was unconstitutional.132 
One may see fit to distinguish school prayer from military 
prayer.  We are first introduced to the federal case law that 
addresses public prayer in military institutions (albeit, colleges) in 
the final two district court cases of the Section.133  While not 
Supreme Court cases, the focus on the unique nature of the 
military academies is telling.  As discussed in Section V, the 
military, similar to its academies, is a coercive institution.  One’s 
life is restricted to a much larger extent, and one’s personal 
behavior is subject to much higher scrutiny. 
E. Katcoff v. Marsh and Town of Greece v. Galloway: The 
Legislative Prayer Exception 
A major exemption to the string of prohibitive case law on 
religious practices in government deals with legislative prayer.  
The major Supreme Court cases on the topic are Marsh v. 
Chambers134 and Town of Greece v. Galloway.135 
In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld the Nebraska 
legislature’s practice of beginning their sessions with a prayer by 
a state-funded Chaplain.136  The Court was very particular to 
state that it “granted certiorari limited to the challenge to the 
practice of opening sessions with prayers by a State-employed 
clergyman.”137  The Court focused on the fact that opening 
sessions of legislative and other deliberative bodies with prayer 
have long been a part of the history and tradition of the United 
 
 132.  Id. at 296.  In deferring to the founders, the court stressed Madison’s 
“Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.”  Id. at 287.  
They interpreted Madison’s writings to oppose any relations between church 
and state—in any form and degree—thereby interpreting the prohibitions in 
the Establishment Clause as broadly as possible.  Id. 
 133.  See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003); Anderson, 
466 F.2d. 283–84. 
 134.  463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). 
 135.  134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).  There have been other cases that have 
found certain direct religious activity, other than prayer, permissible under 
the Lemon test.  See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) 
(permitting a crèche in its Christmas display).  But see Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989) (prohibiting a crèche on public property, 
mainly distinguishing it from Lynch in that it included the phrase, “Glory to 
God for the birth of Jesus Christ”), abrogated by Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811. 
 136.  463 U.S. at 795. 
 137.  Id. at 786. 
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States.138 
There is discussion in the media that a more recent case, 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, paves the way to more religion in 
government.139  However, a review of the case demonstrates it 
simply extends the preexisting, narrow exemption of Marsh.  The 
case involved multiple attendants of town hall meetings who 
objected to the use of sectarian invocations.140  The attendants 
requested an injunction limiting prayers to nonsectarian 
material.141  Of even greater a constitutional concern than Marsh, 
the content of the invocation typically invoked Jesus.142  If we 
recall his poetic benediction in Lee, Justice Kennedy staunchly 
refused to entertain the government undertaking the task of even 
nonsectarian prayer.143  He posed a far different theory here.144  
To defer to the media’s assertions regarding this case, Justice 
Kennedy, who spoke for the majority, stated, in inexplicable 
contrast to Lee, 
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would 
force the legislatures that sponsor prayers and the courts 
that are asked to decide these cases to act as supervisors 
and censors of religious speech, a rule that would involve 
 
 138.  Id.  Lee, described above, makes reference to Marsh, distinguishing it 
from the public school context because of the greater ability of legislators to 
“enter and leave with little comment.”  505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992). 




 140.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1817. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 1816.  The Court notes that invocations typically included the 
following language: 
Lord we ask you to send your spirit of servanthood upon all of us 
gathered here this evening to do your work for the benefit of all in 
our community.  We ask you to bless our elected and appointed 
officials so they may deliberate with wisdom and act with courage.  
Bless the members of our community who come here to speak before 
the board so they may state their cause with honesty and 
humility. . . . Lord we ask you to bless us all, that everything we do 
here tonight will move you to welcome us one day into your kingdom 
as good and faithful servants.  We ask this in the name of our 
brother Jesus. Amen.   
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588–89. 
 144.  See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1822. 
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government in religious matters to a far greater degree 
than is the case under the town’s current practice of 
neither editing or approving prayers in advance nor 
criticizing their content after the fact.145 
The definitive language of the case is that “[a]bsent a pattern of 
prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an 
impermissible government purpose, a challenge based solely on 
the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional 
violation.”146 
The Court limited the scope of the case on the following facts, 
“[town] leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any 
persuasion, including an atheist, could give the invocation.”147  
Indeed, the predomination of Christian prayer reflected only the 
predominantly Christian identity of the town’s congregations from 
which the Chaplains came.148 
One would be naïve to imply this case is helpful to the 
ultimate propositions of this Article.  However, it is notably 
distinguishable to the substance of this Article.  The Court treated 
Galloway like legislative prayer, as addressed in Marsh.149  Like 
Marsh, the case was decided based upon the notion of a long-term 
history of legislative prayer stretching back to the framing of the 
Constitution.150  Seemingly making a distinction without a 
difference, Justice Kennedy wrote, “Marsh must not be understood 
as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional 
violation if not for its historical foundation.  The case instead 
taught that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by 
reference to historical practices and understandings.’”151  In sum, 
 
 145.  Id.  Strangely, Justice Kennedy references Lee for the proposition 
that a civic religion does not avoid the Establishment Clause analysis, while 
concurrently arguing that prayers that give greater deference to one religion 
do not offend the Establishment Clause.  Id. (“Government may not mandate 
a civic religion that stifles any but the most generic reference to the sacred 
any more than it may prescribe a religious orthodoxy.”).  See also Lee, 505 
U.S. at 590 (“The suggestion that government may establish an official or 
civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more 
specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.”).  
 146.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
 147.  Id. at 1816. 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id. at 1822; see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983). 
 150.  Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1818. 
 151.  Id. at 1819 (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 670 
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Justice Kennedy explained, “Marsh stands for the proposition that 
it is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the 
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific 
practice is permitted.”152  While this is a concerning method of 
determining constitutionality, it nevertheless appears to limit the 
holding to cases involving legislative prayer.  The Court also 
makes relevant that the principal audience for the invocations is 
the lawmakers themselves, not the other attendants at the 
meeting, negating the issue of coercion.153  The majority 
explained, “[t]he analysis would be different if town board 
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled 
out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions 
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer 
opportunity.”154  The Court further distinguished the case from 
Lee and Santa Fe based upon the reasoning that coercion did not 
exist under the circumstances of the case currently before it.155  
All of that said, insofar as Galloway makes any substantive 
change to the case law, it is limited and certainly gives limited aid 
to the analysis of religious practices in the military. 
The case law leaves a gap between the permissible religious 
activity of legislative prayer and the impermissible religious 
activity of prayer in primary and secondary schools, as well as 
military academies.  This creates the question as to whether the 
 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).  
 152.  Id.  While the author is not opposed to constitutional interpretation 
by reference to the founding of the United States, it is concerning that a legal 
position bases constitutionality on its long-term application.  Indeed, slavery 
was deemed consistent with our Constitution by many of our founders; yet, 
the impermissibility of its savage disregard for the human condition extended 
well prior.  In other words, our founding was rife with universally understood 
immorality, and errors made for centuries do not unilaterally become legal.  
Furthermore, to imply a reading of the Constitution which utilizes only the 
beliefs of the Founding Fathers has two additional glaring incongruities—the 
Founding Fathers rarely agreed on any one interpretation of any one article 
or amendment (for example, many of them believed in the illegality of slavery 
upon drafting the Constitution) and further, the likelihood that the Founding 
Fathers could ever have conceived of a world like the one in which we now 
live.  Would they think differently about the Establishment Clause with 
regard to legislative prayer had they not all been Christian? 
 153.  Id. at 1825. 
 154.  Id. at 1826. 
 155.  Id. at 1827 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 
312 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–94 (1992)). 
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broad prohibition described in Engel is the proper one in contexts 
outside of legislative sessions.  That is, is the legislative context 
unique, or is the school context unique?  Considering that the 
language of Engel is still good law, it appears more likely the 
former is true.  Further, case law following Marsh has 
significantly limited its scope.156  In Allegheny, the Court 
explained, “[i]n Marsh, the Court relied specifically on the fact 
that Congress authorized legislative prayer at the same time that 
it produced the Bill of Rights.”157  Further, Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence in Lee notes, citing Engel and School District of 
Abington Township v. Schempp, “it is not enough that the 
government refrain from compelling religious practices: It must 
not engage in them either.”158  Without a declaration, the 
concurrence in Lee appears to have recommended overruling 
Marsh.159  One might also consider Justice Scalia’s treatment of 
Marsh in his concurrence in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School District, where he said, “when we wish to 
uphold a practice it [the Lemon test] forbids, we ignore it [the 
Lemon test] entirely.”160 
A valid question might be, are military members more like 
legislators or students?  Anyone who has ever served could far 
more easily analogize the military hierarchy with the latter.  This 
will be addressed in more detail below in Section V.  In any case, 
even some writers, who are more forgiving of religious practices in 
the military, caution against the use of prayer at military 
events.161  If the analysis of this Article were limited solely to this, 
the proposition would be that it is only a matter of time before a 
military member successfully brings the DoD to task on this very 
issue.162  A preemptive decision to appropriately apply the limited 
 
 156.  See, e.g., Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819; Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 319–20; 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603. 
 157.  492 U.S. at 602. 
 158.  505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring)). 
 159.  See id.  
 160.  508 U.S 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
 161.  See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 44–45. 
 162.  See Lakin, supra note 26, 735–37 (discussing existing cases on the 
topic). 
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functions of the Chaplaincy and eliminate public prayer could 
avoid that inevitability. 
IV. FREE SPEECH 
Some would argue that public prayer and religious speech are 
simple freedom of speech issues.163  The relevant Free Speech 
Clause standard is as follows: in a public forum—a publicly 
funded place which traditionally permits a wide range of speech 
on any topic164—a law, policy, or government employee acting in 
their official capacity may not limit the free exchange of thought 
based upon its content without a “compelling state interest.”165  
This is referred to as the strict scrutiny standard, similar to the 
test employed in free exercise cases.  Is this right?  Does one 
simply apply content-based, speech analysis to prohibiting 
religious speech in the military workplace?  The answer lies in the 
Supreme Court case of Widmar v. Vincent, which used both the 
Free Speech Clause and the Lemon test to determine the 
constitutionality of religious speech.166 
A. Widmar v. Vincent and Progeny:  The Intersection of Free 
Speech and Religion 
While the Supreme Court has ruled on federal actions 
 
 163.  See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981) (quoting 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). 
 164.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45 (1983).  The common example is a park, the sidewalk, etc.  See id. (quoting 
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).  Case law has also 
seen fit to address the process of turning a non-public forum into a limited or 
totally public forum based upon its regular practice.  See, e.g., Widmar, 454 
U.S. at 267 (“Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the 
University has created a forum generally open for use by student groups.  
Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to justify its 
discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms.”). 
 165.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774–75 (2002) 
(“Under the strict-scrutiny test, respondents have the burden to prove that 
the announce clause is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state 
interest.”); accord Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (“As a facially 
content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, § 2–7–111(b) 
must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the 
‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 
45)).  
 166.  454 U.S. at 271–72. 
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prohibiting religious activities in open forums under the Free 
Speech Clause, it did so in conjunction with the Establishment 
Clause’s Lemon test.167  In Widmar, the Supreme Court found it 
impermissible for the University of Missouri (“UMKC”) to prohibit 
religious student groups from using its facilities under a free 
speech analysis.168  The Court determined that, by permitting 
general access to school facilities by student groups, the school 
created an open forum for use by student groups.169  By doing so, 
the school obligated itself to pose no prohibition on content 
without demonstrating that the restriction was narrowly tailored 
to serving a compelling government interest.170 
Interestingly, the Court agreed that ensuring compliance with 
the Establishment Clause is indeed a compelling government 
interest.171  However, the Court went on to find, recounting the 
Lemon test, that the school’s prior equal access program—which 
incidentally included only religious organizations—did not create 
an Establishment Clause issue.172  As per Lemon’s precedent, the 
Court explained that a government activity or policy does not pose 
an establishment issue where it has a secular purpose, its 
principal or primary impact which does not advance or inhibit 
religion, and it does not create excessive government 
entanglement with religion.173 
However, the devil is in the details, and the Court leaves open 
the possibility of running afoul of the Establishment Clause, even 
in an open forum, in some cases.  The Court explained, “[t]he 
provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an 
important index of secular effect.”174  The Court continued, “[a]t 
least in the absence of empirical evidence that religious groups 
will dominate UMKC’s open forum, we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the advancement of religion would not be the forum’s 
‘primary effect.’”175  Therefore, if such empirical evidence was 
 
 167.  See id. 
 168.  Id. at 266. 
 169.  Id. at 267. 
 170.  Id. at 269–70 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)). 
 171.  Id. at 270–71. 
 172.  Id. at 271–72. 
 173.  Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 
(1971)). 
 174.  Id. at 274. 
 175.  Id. at 275. 
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available, the Court’s determination may have been different.  
Indeed, this language mimicked the reference in Lemon that the 
larger the number of people served by the program, the greater 
the danger of infringing on the Establishment Clause.176 
Another well-known example of the Court upholding religious 
activity on government property is Lamb’s Chapel.177  There, the 
Supreme Court deemed a New York law authorizing after-hours 
use of school property to local organizations to the exclusion of 
religious organizations unconstitutional.178  An evangelical church 
filed suit following multiple denials of access to local school 
district facilities after hours.179  Though the Court did not refer to 
the school as an open forum as it had in Widmar, a similar 
analysis was undertaken.180  Indeed, the Court explained that 
insofar as the forum is opened to a certain class, the government 
may restrict access to those outside of the class unless “it denies 
access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he 
espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”181  Any such denial 
would be in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the 
Constitution.182  Like Widmar, here, there was insufficient 
entanglement to justify prohibition under the Establishment 
Clause.183 
With regard to the issues that form the basis of this Article, 
the average military base is not an open forum.184  In Greer v. 
Spock, a suit was brought to enjoin U.S. Army Base, Fort Dix 
regulations, which prohibited political demonstrations and also 
limited the distribution of literature on base without headquarters 
approval.185  The Court determined that even when civilians are 
entitled to free access to certain portions of a military base, the 
property does not become a public forum, and therefore, the 
 
 176.  Compare with Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. 
 177.  508 U.S 384, 395 (1993). 
 178.  Id. at 393. 
 179.  Id. at 387–89.  The church wanted to broadcast a religious themed 
movie.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 395; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267. 
 181.  Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 395. 
 184.  See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
 185.  Id. at 832.  
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regulation was constitutional.186  As a result, an argument for a 
free speech right to unbridled prayer or proselytization on a 
military base falls short. 
B. Other Limitations on Free Speech:  Political Speech 
Not buying that such an essential right as religious 
expression could be limited?  While the issue of restricting 
religious speech at work has not been the topic of much Supreme 
Court discussion, the prohibition on political speech, deemed the 
core of freedom of speech protections, has been subject to 
significant restrictions by the federal government for some 
time.187  As to the importance of political speech, consider 
Garrison v. Louisiana, where the Supreme Court explained, 
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is 
the essence of self-government.”188  In NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., the Court announced the proposition that speech 
on public issues occupies the “highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values.”189  Moreover, the Court left no doubt in 
Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Central Committee that “the First 
Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech 
uttered during a campaign for political office.”190 
Despite being placed upon the altar, consider the political 
speech restrictions the Supreme Court has permitted at the public 
workplace in Connick v. Meyers.191  There, a disgruntled Assistant 
District Attorney in New Orleans was fired for distributing a 
questionnaire that was critical of the transfer policies and political 
behavior of the office.192  Heavily relying upon Pickering v. Board 
of Education,193 the Court explained that the First Amendment’s 
 
 186.  Id. at 838. 
 187.  See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). 
 188.  Id. at 74–75. 
 189.  458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); accord Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 
(1980). 
 190.  489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 
U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
 191.  461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
 192.  Id. at 141. 
 193.  391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  Pickering involved a suit by a teacher who 
was dismissed for writing a letter to the editor of a local paper that was 
critical of the school board’s use of funding.  Id. at 566–67.  The Court 
explained that determining permissible limits on speech in public 
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protection of the freedom of expression—that is, ensuring a 
citizen’s interest in commenting on matters of public concern—
must be balanced against the state’s interest “in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”194  In upholding the assistant DA’s dismissal, the 
Court explained: 
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as 
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern 
to the community, government officials should enjoy wide 
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First 
Amendment.  Perhaps the government employer’s 
dismissal of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary 
dismissals from government service which violate no 
fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not 
subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the 
dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.195 
The Court elaborated: 
When close working relationships are essential to 
fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of 
deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.  
Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer 
to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption 
of the office and the destruction of working relationships 
is manifest before taking action.196 
Finally, the Court recognized that “manner, time, and place” is a 
relevant consideration.197  The majority found that providing the 
 
employment is “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a 
citizen, in commenting on matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”  Id. at 568.  The Court determined that 
non-defamatory, however negligently false, statements made regarding the 
operations of a school board, where the issue is of public interest, are not a 
ground for dismissal, and prohibiting said speech is a violation of freedom of 
speech.  Id. at 572–75.  Note, the protection is not limited to firing, but also 
failure to rehire.  See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972). 
 194.  Connick, 461 U.S. at 142. 
 195.  Id. at 146–47. 
 196.  Id. at 151–52. 
 197.  Id. at 152. 
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questionnaire at work and the fact that the process pulled both 
the plaintiff and her coworkers away from their work leant more 
credence to the government’s case.198 
Continuing the review of permissible limitations on political 
speech, note the ramifications of Department of Defense Directive 
1344.10 (“DoD Directive 1344.10”), which puts significant 
limitations on political speech among military members.199  The 
directive is modeled after the Hatch Act, though ultimately more 
restrictive, which applies to federal government employees.200  By 
analogy, consider United Public Workers of America (CIO) v. 
Mitchell, a challenge to the Hatch Act’s prohibition on federal 
employees’ participation in political management and 
campaigns.201  The Court found that being politically active, even 
in one’s personal capacity, may be limited under the 
Constitution.202  The Court explained, “it is accepted 
constitutional doctrine that these fundamental human rights are 
not absolutes.”203  The Court expounded upon legal bases for 
prohibiting certain speech: 
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of 
enactments has been to promote efficiency and integrity 
in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper 
discipline in the public service.  Clearly such a purpose is 
within the just scope of legislative power, and it is not 
easy to see why the act now under consideration does not 
come fairly within the legitimate means to such an 
end.204 
Surely though, no such prohibition could stand the test of 
time.  But, indeed, it has.  In United States Civil Service 
Commission v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, the 
 
 198.  Id.  
 199.  DoD Dir. 1344.10, supra note 23. 
 200.  The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2012). 
 201.  330 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1947).  It is worth noting as the Court stresses 
the specific facts of the case—the main petitioner was a ward executive 
committeeman who was active on Election Day as a poll worker and a 
paymaster for the services of other party workers.  Id. at 94. 
 202.  Id. at 94–95. 
 203.  Id. at 95. 
 204.  Id. at 97 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to the same provision of 
the Hatch Act as vague and overbroad.205  In addition to the 
specifics of the case, the Court expounded that they would even 
find a statute that stated the following constitutional: 
[I]n plain and understandable language, the statute 
forbade activities such as organizing a political party or 
club; actively participating in fund-raising activities for a 
partisan candidate or political party . . . initiating or 
circulating a partisan nominating petition or soliciting 
votes for a partisan candidate for public office; or serving 
as a delegate.206 
All of these legal prohibitions, the Court need not have 
specified, included acting in one’s personal capacity. Therefore, 
free speech restrictions are not limited to activities on the job, but 
also on one’s personal time as well.  While the issue has not been 
addressed by the Supreme Court, DoD Directive 1344.10’s 
prohibitions also include “[s]peak[ing] before a partisan political 
gathering, including any gathering that promotes a partisan 
political party, candidate, or cause.”207  Does this elucidation 
confirm the righteousness of these rules?  Of course not.  However, 
considering the altar upon which political speech sits, there is 
reason to believe that religious practices, an area similarly 
protected by the Constitution, may be subject to similar limitation 
under the First Amendment as it relates to the military.  It should 
come as no surprise then, that proselytizing at work would likely 
receive reduced free speech protection. 
V. COERCION AND THE MILITARY 
One of the underlying principles of this discussion is the issue 
of coercion.  Certainly, it appears clear that coercion is not 
necessary in order to fail the Lemon test.208  Coercion, as a lone 
component of Establishment Clause analysis, “fails to take 
account of the numerous more subtle ways that government can 
show favoritism to particular beliefs or convey a message of 
 
 205.  413 U.S. 548, 579–80 (1973). 
 206.  Id. at 556.  
 207.  DoD Dir. 1344.10, supra note 23, ¶ 4.1.2.5 (emphasis added). 
 208.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
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disapproval to others.”209  However, coercive practices pose so 
significant an Establishment Clause violation and are so 
frequently discussed in jurisprudence, that some argue there has 
been a separate coercion test developed.210  The military, as 
argued below, is particularly prone to the type of coercion which 
precedent on religious practices by government entities sought to 
curtail.  Further, perhaps more than civilian institutions, coercion 
and endorsement are directly linked, as the rank on a uniform 
(endorsement) breeds conformity from others (coercion).211 
To begin, consider the principles underlying Article 31 of the 
UCMJ.212  In the civilian criminal justice system, following arrest, 
or the equivalent thereof, the police must provide a rights 
advisement to a suspect only when the police are questioning a 
suspect.213  However, the military system requires that a subject 
receive a rights advisement before being questioned by any 
military member, so long as the subject is only suspected of 
committing a crime, regardless of arrest or custody.214  The notion 
is that the military structure is such that military members feel so 
compelled to follow orders that a Miranda warning is not 
sufficient to protect their 5th Amendment rights.  Therefore, a 
rights advisement must be provided, not upon custodial 
interrogation (the civilian standard), but as soon as they are 
suspected of a crime.215  This principle is not found in civilian law 
enforcement.  Military defense attorneys often file unlawful 
command influence motions against military prosecutors, 
following announcements by installation commanders to “get 
tough on crime” or commercials indicating zero tolerance policies.  
Article 31 embodies this inherent and undeniable aspect of 
 
 209.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627–28 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 
(2014). 
 210.  See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 12. 
 211.  Indeed, a close reading of Santa Fe shows that endorsement and 
coercion can be interrelated.  530 U.S. 290, 310–13 (2000).  There, the 
majority explained that the sheer existence of prayer at a football game was 
coercive.  Id. at 311–12.  Though individuals need not attend, peer pressure 
to conform was sufficient to strip the activity of a sufficient level of 
voluntariness to avoid running afoul of the Constitution.  Id. 
 212.  UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (2012). 
 213.  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 214.  10 U.S.C. § 831. 
 215.  Id. 
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military life.  Yet, we are willing to negate the influence of public 
prayer or proselytizing at work, so long as they are not in the 
chain of command?  The logic is ineffable.  There is simply too 
much coercion inherent in the system to disregard the impact both 
down and across the military rank structure. 
Further, consider how the court in Mellen explained the 
coercive nature found at the Virginia Military Institute identifying 
that “obedience and conformity remain central tenets of the 
school’s educational philosophy.”216  The terms “obedience” and 
“conformity” are frequently used in describing the military 
environment, and it would not be a stretch to apply a similar 
description to military events.  Noteworthy in particular, while 
cadets are free to withdraw from their academies, a military 
member is not free to withdraw from the military until the end of 
their obligation.217  While cadets may be subjected to “adversative 
method[s] of education,”218 military members may be ordered into 
live gunfire.  In no uncertain terms, ideally at the least, a superior 
orders and the subordinate follows.  Further, in terms of the 
influence of contemporaries, superiors may be a military member’s 
only human interaction, and the people one must trust to ensure 
their safety.  In addition to the threat of solitude for failing to 
conform, compliance could mean the difference between life and 
death.  A military member does not remove their uniform to go to 
lunch or take a smoke break.  A military member does not put on 
civilian clothing at the end of the day and shed the requirement to 
act according to the rules, regulations, and customs of the 
service—a fact that they are persistently reminded of.  As 
previously discussed, free expression restrictions acknowledge this 
in both the civilian-federal, as well military, contexts.  Why would 
the religious clauses operate any differently? 
VI. APPLICATION 
Step one in this analysis is attribution.  At what point are an 
individual’s actions subject to constitutional limitation?  Consider 
the language found in Lee, “[a] school official, the principal, 
 
 216.  327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 217.  U.S. Armed Forces, Enlistment/Reenlistment Document, available at 
http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/infomgt/forms/eforms/dd0004.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2014). 
 218.  Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371. 
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decided that an invocation and a benediction should be given; this 
is a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional 
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must 
occur.”219  One’s right, as an individual, to practice his religion 
freely has received significant protection.220  The sovereign is not 
limited to the federal “Governmental Trinity,” but extends 
through the veins of subcomponents and employees, in this case 
the DoD and its leadership.  When one puts on his police or 
military uniform or steps over the threshold of the Capitol 
Building as a federal employee, he transforms into an agent of the 
government.  In this alter ego they are not performing in their 
individual capacity, but as government actors that are subject to 
the limitations of the Establishment Clause.221  What legal 
scholar could argue that the actions of a base commander, unit 
commander, first sergeant, or supervisor of a unit in uniform be 
treated differently than the actions in Lee? 
Some would argue for applying the objective observer 
standard—that is derived from civilian school-prayer cases—to 
the military in order to determine whether an individual is 
operating as a representative of the government.222  After all, the 
Supreme Court has explained, “there is a crucial difference 
between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses 
protect.”223  However, the objective observer standard does not 
necessarily recognize the coercion to conform, vertically and 
horizontally along the chain, inherent in the military.  For this 
reason, the objective observer would not necessarily be the 
appropriate standard to apply. 
The next issue is whether religious activity as it exists in the 
military today must be permitted under the Free Exercise Clause.  
Air Force Academy Professor David Fitzkee wrote, “some major 
world religions—notably Christianity, the largest religion in the 
United States and the military—encourage their members to 
 
 219.  505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 220.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000). 
 221.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 222.  See, e.g., Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 9, at 31. 
 223.  Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290 at 302.  
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convert nonbelievers to their faith.”224  He further notes, “leaders 
(and those complaining) must recognize that the First Amendment 
protects proselytizing.”225  Some would argue that free exercise 
requires permitting proselytizing in military organizations, as 
mandated by many world religions.226  As the author cannot claim 
the sentiment as his own, credit is given to fictional character 
President Josiah Bartlet from the West Wing television show: 
I’m interested in selling my youngest daughter into 
slavery as sanctioned in Exodus 21:7.  She’s a 
Georgetown sophomore, speaks fluent Italian, always 
cleaned the table when it was her turn.  What would a 
good price for her be?  My chief of staff, Leo McGarry, 
insists on working on the Sabbath.  Exodus 35:2 clearly 
says he should be put to death.  Am I morally obligated to 
kill him myself or is it okay to call the police?  Here’s one 
that’s really important cause we’ve got a lot of sports fans 
in this town: touching the skin of a dead pig makes one 
unclean.  Leviticus 11:7.  If they promise to wear gloves 
can the Washington Redskins still play football?  Can 
Notre Dame?  Can West Point?  Does the whole town 
really have to be together to stone my brother, John, for 
planting different crops side by side?  Can I burn my 
mother in a small family gathering for wearing garments 
made from two different threads?227 
Clauses of this nature are not unique to the Judeo-Christian 
faith systems.  Indeed many religious texts contain commands 
that American society rightfully does not apply.  The concern for a 
veritable, carte blanche right to apply religious practices in any 
forum does not belong exclusively to Hollywood and fictional 
characters.  Recall the explanation of the Court in Reynolds that, 
if such an expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause were taken, 
even human sacrifice may have to be permitted.228 
 
 224.  David E. Fitzkee, Religious Speech in the Military: Freedoms and 
Limitations, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q. PARAMETERS, Autumn 2011, at 59, 64, 
available at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/ 
Articles/2011autumn/Fitzkee.pdf.  
 225.  Id. 
 226.  See, e.g., id. 
 227.  West Wing:  The Midterms (NBC television broadcast Oct. 18, 2000). 
 228.  98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
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The moral to be taken is, “[t]he principle that government 
may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede 
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment 
Clause.”229  There is a certain point when the religious expression 
of one, as a government employee, triggers the prohibition on 
government endorsement designed to protect the religious beliefs 
of all.  That being said, the courts have explained that a 
compelling government interest is required to prohibit religious 
activity by the government.230  In Widmar, the Supreme Court 
clarified that observance of the Establishment Clause is a 
compelling government interest.231  Therefore, a prohibition of 
religious activity in the military workplace would not be 
inherently invalid under free exercise as it would be in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, that is, 
maintaining the Establishment Clause. 
Moving to specific examples, when and to what extent is 
public prayer appropriate in the military?  Might one doubt the 
constitutionality of an Air Force Network (“AFN”) commercial, 
done by a Colonel military Chaplain, encouraging members to 
“flex their faith muscles”?  What prohibits a commander from 
encouraging military members to read the New Testament?  What 
about a member encouraging another member to convert to 
Christianity, or regularly citing scripture at work? 
Prayer has received a great deal of coverage in this Article.  If 
the Mellen standard applies here, then, insofar as the military 
employs “detailed regulation of conduct and the indoctrination of a 
strict moral code,” prayer at mandatory military events is 
inherently coercive.232  It, therefore, fails the Lemon test and, 
further, is de jure coercive under the coercion test recommended 
by Justice O’Connor233 and addressed by the Fourth Circuit in 
 
 229.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 230.  See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963). 
 231.  454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981). 
 232.  Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003); see also 
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 233.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 628–29 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment), abrogated by Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).  
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Mellen.234  However, consider the ramifications of these prayers 
even without presumptive coerciveness.  In an organization that 
inserts religion into public events, imagine the ramifications when 
all but a few members of the audience bow their heads in 
observance of a prayer?  Must an atheist military member negate 
their views and observe the prayer or else chance the wrath of 
their religious commander or supervisor?  Even if not deemed de 
jure coercive, it is indeed coercive-in-fact. 
Under a free speech analysis, Greer clarifies that a military 
base is not a public forum.235  Therefore, a compelling government 
interest in limiting public prayer is not necessary.  However, for 
purposes of argument, this review will still utilize that higher 
standard.  In Widmar, the Court explained that a government 
agency may pose no prohibition on content without demonstrating 
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serving a compelling 
government interest.236  As stressed on multiple occasions, the 
Court agreed that ensuring compliance with the Establishment 
Clause is indeed a compelling government interest.237  Therefore, 
insofar as prayer at mandatory military events is in violation of 
the Establishment Clause, there is no free speech violation even 
under the higher standard. 
Professor Fitzkee comments: 
Proselytizing violates the Establishment Clause if 
military members are misusing their official position to 
advance, favor, endorse, or coerce religion.  This might 
apply to members of the chain of command proselytizing 
subordinates on duty or to service providers proselytizing 
customers while providing a service.238 
Clearly then, some private speech in the workplace is 
prohibited by the Constitution.  However, with all due respect to 
Professor Fitzkee, the strict facts given in his example are not 
necessary to fail the Lemon test.  All that is required to be deemed 
 
 234.  327 F.3d at 365. 
 235.  424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976). 
 236.  454 U.S. at 269–70. 
 237.  Id. at 271. 
 238.  Fitzkee, supra note 224, at 67; accord Fitzkee & Letendre, supra 
note 9, at 30 (“The Establishment Clause is violated if it appears to the 
reasonable observer that the government, through its employee’s speech, is 
coercing or endorsing religion.”). 
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unconstitutional is that a government actor, in this case at work 
or in uniform, engages in activity which does not have a secular 
purpose, or has the primary purpose of advancing or inhibiting 
religion, or results in excessive government entanglement with 
religion.239  Any individual proselytizing at work, leadership or 
not, would appear to be in violation.  Rank and position in the 
military might only serve to extend the restriction outside of work. 
Returning to the hypotheticals, a commander instructing his 
subordinates to read the New Testament, in-and-of-itself appears 
to fail all three elements of the Lemon test.  Perhaps a scenario 
similar to that found in Lynch v. Donnelly240 could help to explain 
the situation. The commander could have encouraged members to 
read sections of the New Testament and other secular and 
religious texts as professional development insofar as they 
implicate the tenets of leadership.  However, minus extenuating 
circumstances such as these, there is no secular purpose in such 
an instruction.  There is no purpose other than advancing religion.  
This activity excessively involves the government in religion, 
particularly considering the commander’s rank and position. 
With regard to the AFN commercial, the argument, though 
debatable, could be that there is a secular purpose for flexing one’s 
faith muscles, that is, to ensure military readiness.  However, the 
primary purpose must be secular, which is not the case here.  In 
any case, the action has the obvious intended effect of advancing 
religion.  Placing the commercial on AFN creates the clear 
impression of government entanglement with religion.  
Encouraging other military members to convert to Christianity 
poses an even clearer violation, particularly when encouraged by a 
member of superior rank or position, thereby resulting in coercion. 
Moving the analysis slightly, consider if a relatively low 
ranking military member in a customer service-orientated field 
answered every phone call with, “Jesus saves, how can I help 
you?”  What if a noncommissioned officer (“NCO”) did the same?  
The unit commander?  All of these actions would appear to fail the 
Lemon test, and the higher the rank of the speaker, the more 
likely the act is to qualify as coercion.  Regular recitation of 
scripture at work could result in the same issues.  One step 
 
 239.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 240.  465 U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984). 
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further into the gray, imagine that a low ranking member likes to 
tell others in the office about the sermon he heard over the 
weekend in the break room on Mondays or encourages colleagues 
to attend Church.  Now, what if an NCO did it?  The commander?  
While a little more difficult, again, it appears that somewhere the 
Constitution has been violated.  A prohibition on any of these 
activities would not be deemed impermissible under free exercise 
as there is a compelling interest in maintaining the Establishment 
Clause.241 
However, what about free speech analysis?  In Connick, the 
Court made it clear that in the public workplace, a court must 
balance an individual’s interest in commenting on public concerns 
against the government’s interest in conducting the public 
services it performs.242  The former is subject to significant 
limitation when the employee’s communication does not relate to a 
matter of community concern.243  A commander’s belief in the 
Bible is of personal, not community, concern.  Proselytizing co-
workers suffers from the same shortcoming.  Could such 
proselytizing impact the “efficiency of the public services”244 that 
the military performs?  It certainly could.  Is the singular opinion 
of one, or few members, on his own religion or religious mandate 
to spread the word “[a] matter of political, social, or other concern 
to the community?”245  It is certainly not, unless we are, once and 
for all to declare the United States a country of singular religious 
background for which Americans are free to indoctrinate the 
masses as they see fit.  This is not without precedence.  It is quite 
common in many Middle Eastern countries.  The Islamic 
Brotherhood would then find itself among rivals for religious 
dominion of world governments.  The type of close working 
relationship described in Connick is inherent in most military 
career fields.  This fact is almost inevitable due to the military 
hierarchy, where supervisors, first sergeants, and commanders 
are involved with their members personal lives on a daily basis.  It 
is all the more so in deployed locations, where the court in Katcoff 
has expressed perhaps the greatest need for the military 
 
 241.  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981). 
 242.  461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
 243.  Id. at 146. 
 244.  Id. at 142. 
 245.  Id. at 146. 
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Chaplaincy.246 
This is all supported by the case law on political speech.  In 
Mitchell, the Court clarified that being politically active, even in 
one’s personal capacity, may be limited under the Constitution.247  
How could it be constitutional to prohibit an individual from 
soliciting votes for a candidate or speaking about partisan causes, 
but not to prohibit them from soliciting votes for Allah or 
discussing the position of the Gospels? 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
In the era of the professional military, one must note that 
most Fortune 500 companies are not beginning their events with 
invocations and neither should the military.  It is easy, 
particularly in a bureaucracy, to find solace in historical 
consistency.  A common theme in many areas of the military is 
that tradition should be respected or, short of tradition, a certain 
practice has always been conducted a particular way.  The cases of 
Katcoff, Engel, Lee, and Santa Fe all support the proposition that 
“preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is 
a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere.”248  
One thing is for certain: a cautioned approach to military prayer is 
the most reasonable tack in order to avoid stumbling upon the 
prohibitions of Lemon. 
It is difficult to argue with the old adage, “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it.”  However, with regard to religious practices in the 
military, it is broken.  It has been for some time.  In fact, this 
perhaps underscores the coercive nature of compliance, which is 
inherent in the DoD, that there have not been more lawsuits for 
religious practices therein.  The military workplace applies the 
social pressures acknowledged in school cases to an exponentially 
greater extent, creating the very coercion feared in Lee.249  The 
punishment for failure to conform in the military can put one’s 
livelihood, and ultimately life, at risk.  Due to these inherent 
truths of military life, more so than other federal institutions, the 
 
 246.  755 F.2d 223, 228, 232 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 247.  330 U.S. 75, 103 (1947). 
 248.  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (citing 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)).   
 249.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
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military is likely falling afoul of even the more universally 
accepted coercion case law. 
Widmar stands for the proposition that complying with the 
Establishment Clause is a sufficiently compelling government 
interest.250  Connick acknowledges that free expression must be 
balanced against the interest in effectively operating a public 
office,251 and Mitchell, as well as United States Civil Service 
Commission, has validated restrictions on speech similar to the 
ones proposed here.252  Therefore, under any standard known to 
law, prayers should be limited to actual religious events.  Further, 
at the least, commanders, NCOs, and military media 
establishments should not be proselytizing, and peer proselytizing 
should be kept outside of the workplace.  Finally, repercussions 
taken against a member for failure to adopt a “preferred” religious 




 250.  454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981). 
 251.  461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
 252.  U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, 
413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 82. 
